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ROSS'S PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY¹

THERE are at present almost as many systems of sociology as there are teachers in the field who are capable of systematizing their ideas. What sociology will ultimately become is still, after a full generation of university teaching, impossible to predict. It will probably depend upon who produces the first treatise with sufficient mastery of facts, logical consistency, and systematic balance to dominate the minds of a large number of students. Spencer's monumental treatise probably comes nearer reaching that mark than any other; but it runs counter to the drift of opinion among the emotional devotees of the sociological cult, and has not won a mastery over their minds. Almost the only general statement that one can make regarding sociology as actually taught in schools and expounded in treatises is that it is a refuge for all those who revolt against the cold, unemotional reasoning of the dominant school of economists, and who turn to sociology as a means of finding quasi-scientific labels for their sentimental whims. Most recent treatises on the subject consist mainly, therefore, of a new set of terms for old and trite subjects.

It has been known for a long time that Professor Ross was preparing a general treatise which would systematize sociology as he saw it. It was easy to foresee that the work, when completed, would be a notable contribution, that it would be brilliant in style, that there would not be a dull page or paragraph in the entire book, and that whether it was convincing or not, almost every statement would arrest attention and compel thought. In all these respects the completed work surpasses expectations. It was also expected that Ross's economic training would enable him to avoid the weaknesses of many preceding treatises written by men and women who

¹ *Principles of Sociology*. By Edward Allsworth Ross. Pp. xviii, 708. New York. The Century Co.

imagined that a system of sociology could be constructed in the air without regard to the gravitating pull of economic forces. In this respect also the book before us comes almost if not quite up to our expectations.

Further, the author's long experience in teaching, together with his broad academic training and his extensive travel and other opportunities for gathering information led us to expect that this matured product would be a comprehensive and systematic treatise. In this respect it comes quite up to the expectation of those who approach the subject from his point of view. Even those who not only have a different point of view but conceive the subject matter of sociology to be entirely different from that which Ross conceives it to be, among whom the reviewer must count himself, cannot but admit that he has gathered a vast amount of illustrative material, and has classified it and arranged it under a comprehensive scheme; and that therefore this is in the truest sense a systematic treatise or a "system" of sociology. A different question is whether it is likely to be the master treatise which shall hereafter determine the scope and character of sociology, as the *Wealth of Nations* did of economics? It is surely no disrespect to Ross or his book to express doubt. Many great men and many great books are less great than Adam Smith and the *Wealth of Nations*.

It is the reviewer's belief that the work is the best single text book for class room use in the teaching of sociology that has yet appeared, with the possible exception of Spencer's *Principles*. To begin with the least important — the purely mechanical advantages — it is divided into five parts and fifty-seven chapters. The five parts are: The Social Population, Social Forces, Social Processes, Social Products, and Social Principles. More than half of the book, however, including Chapters 8 to 45, is included in Part III — Social Processes. The chapters are short and pointed. Each one can be read quickly before the mind is fatigued or attention flags. Each chapter is headed by a suggestive title which stimulates interest before the reader begins. Considerable time and ingenuity must have been expended in inventing

these headings. A sample group including the titles of the last ten chapters under Part III are Individuation, Liberation, Commercialization, Professionalization, Institutionalization, Expansion, Ossification, Decadence, Transformation, and Reshaping. It must be confessed, however, that it is not always easy to see the connection between the title of a chapter and its subject matter.

Another advantage for class room use is the provocative character of the book. Those teachers who use the method of class room discussion will never lack material. The book fairly bristles with points for controversy. There is scarcely a paragraph that does not contain some statement calculated, like a blow in the face, to start an argument. And a strong feature of the book is its wealth of illustrative material, drawn especially from the fields of psychology and anthropology. In this respect it is surpassed only by Spencer's *Principles* and Sumner's *Folkways*.

Ross regards sociology as primarily a psychological science. In fact he says, in so many words, "The immediate causes of social phenomena are to be sought in human minds" (p. 41). Granting this to be true as to *immediate* causes, it does not follow that the ultimate causes or the determining factors in the long run are psychological. Doubtless, whatever is done in society is done because some one chose to do it or to have it done. One student may therefore be content to find out what determines these choices, but it is surely legitimate for another to try to find out how certain choices work, what happens to those who choose to do thus and so rather than something else, and what has become of those people who made those interesting choices or did those interesting things which the anthropologists recount. It seems to the reviewer that the economic results of mental reactions are quite as important as their sources. In this respect, however, he appears to differ from the behaviorists in the field of economics as well as from the anthropological moralists and the psychological sociologists.

Ross comes very near repudiating the whole idea of selec-

tion by economic forces among the varied and heterogeneous desires of individuals, communities and classes in the opening chapter of Part II on social forces. On page 42 he says:

No sooner have we arrived at the truth first emphasized by Ward that *the social forces are human desires* than we come upon new forms of error. The organic conception of society pictures the desires of individuals as running together into a collective desire for social welfare. This generalized desire for certain results would be the cause of the "social organs" functioning. Thus Spencer is apt to attribute an institution either to the individual's sense of a common interest or to the common sense of an individual interest and to overlook the rôle of special desires behind a particular institution. In accounting for monogamy, he stresses too much its good results and ignores the rôle of male sexual jealousy. He thinks the force which calls customary rules into being is "the consensus of individual interests."

He further endorses the views of such social psychologists as MacDougal, Thorndyke, and Veblen, to the effect that the emotions and instincts are the prime movers in human behavior; but he saves himself by saying (p. 43), "The existence of an instinct is no reason for giving it free cause"; but beyond some vague generalities regarding the sublimation of instincts, he says little to support or amplify the statement.

It seems to the reviewer that Ross leans quite as far in the opposite direction as he accuses Spencer of leaning in the direction of explaining institutions on the ground of economic advantage. As to monogamy, for example, it is doubtless true that male sexual jealousy had a great deal to do with it. It probably had quite as much to do with polygamy, the difference being that the jealous males in one case are of approximately equal power and will therefore not tolerate a monopoly of women whereas in the other case they are of unequal power, and the more powerful ones try to monopolize the women. Besides, when violence is not tolerated the preferences of the women must be given some weight. If the average woman would prefer to be the one wife of a mediocre man to being the second wife of a greater one, her preferences will have something to do with the institution of marriage. In fact most of our economic institutions, including property

and contract, are not created by law at all, but spring up spontaneously and automatically with the suppression of violence. Let the government once suppress violence and property exists. It can only be destroyed by force or violence.

But aside from all this, if monogamy had not proved to be on the whole beneficent, even male sexual jealousy could not have kept it alive, for the reason that monogamous communities would have been handicapped in the struggle for land and subsistence. In this very important and fundamental sense the beneficence of monogamy must be considered as a factor in its existence.

It is probably true, as the behaviorists and psychological sociologists insist, that no institution, or at least almost none, was ever consciously created because men deliberated and arrived at a purely intellectual conclusion that its adoption would be a good thing. Since the social contract theory lost its vogue, no one has ever seriously held such a view. Instincts, emotional interests, special desires, and unreasoning impulses have doubtless been the moving forces. But the great principle of selection is not abolished by this admission. However they may begin, some customs, social habits, institutions work better than others, not always because they fit man's instincts better than others, sometimes for reasons in no way connected with psychology, generally for a mixture of psychological and other reasons. Nearly every boy, when he begins to strop a razor finds it "natural" to turn the razor on its edge rather than on its back. He soon finds that it does not work well. At considerable pains he must train his muscles to work in what seems to be an "unnatural" way. If he had to do the same thing under the orders of a boss he would, if he had read much behavioristic economics and psychological sociology, feel outraged at such an attempt to warp human nature.

This seems, doubtless, a very simple illustration; but it was chosen for that reason. The fact that after the boy has trained his muscles to turn the razor on its back the motions involved begin to seem quite as "natural" as those involved in turning

it upon its edge, indicates that human nature is, within limits, adaptable and can without harm adjust itself to many non-psychological conditions whenever there is a mechanical or economic advantage in doing so. This observation, moreover, has many applications and when widely applied will compel a modification of the findings, not of social psychologists of recognized standing, but of those enemies of the present social order who have seized upon social psychology as a new found weapon of attack.

The observed fact that men do sometimes modify their behavior because they perceive that some mechanical or economic advantage may be secured by so doing can scarcely be ignored by any scientific student. To do so would be as gross a neglect of vital facts as to ignore instincts altogether. But what is meant by the statement, quoted from Veblen, that the instincts are the "prime movers" in human behavior? If it means that, historically and anthropologically, men behaved instinctively long before they began consciously to shape their conduct to rational economic ends, it may be freely admitted; but, what of it? If it means that men *never*, even now, consciously shape their conduct to rational economic ends, it is absurd. If it means that the average man is still mainly controlled by his instincts and only to a slight degree by rational calculation, a number of large and difficult questions are raised.

In the first place, what is meant by the average man? Is it an arithmetical average of all human beings of whatever race, color or condition? If so, can any statement made about him be applied to Americans of the twentieth century? Again, if it were found that calculated advantage is a larger factor in determining the behavior of civilized than of savage men, and that its influence tends to increase as intelligence and civilization advance, is the tendency a matter of importance? Again, suppose it were found that in the same community there was a wide difference among individuals in the degree to which rational calculation influenced behavior, the economically successful classes being more largely controlled by rational calculation than the economically unsuccessful,

would that possess any significance? Would we advise people to control themselves and direct their conduct by rational calculation, or would we advise them to "let nature caper"? It comes down to this; would we advise the boy to learn by hard practice to turn his razor on its back, or to follow his own inclinations?

These questions, or rather this question — for they are all reducible to one — is as old as philosophy, tho it has not often been stated in economic terms. Shall we school and discipline ourselves into conformity with the conditions of successful living, or shall we follow our own proclivities and insist that it is an unjust world which does not bestow success upon us? Shall we labor to acquire those habits which are best, which work well, trusting that practice will eventually make them agreeable, or shall we follow our instincts because of the pleasurable sensations which result, and let the ultimate economic consequences take care of themselves? Does living "according to nature" mean adapting ourselves to nature in the outer sense, or does it mean following our own inherited nature? The progressive parts of the world, that is, those parts where industry has been efficient enough, and governments liberal enough to permit considerable numbers of people to make a living, have all followed the stony road of self-discipline; but there is a distinct tendency to abandon it for the primrose path of instinctive behaviorism. In many circles, educational, religious, sociological, and economic, there is a nervous fear lest child nature or human nature in general should be warped, its instincts thwarted, or that it should be trained out of its "natural" bent.

The process of trial and error, sometimes euphoniously called "creative evolution," is doubtless tending to bring about a harmony between human behavior and the behavior of things. Those individuals who can not readily discipline themselves or conform their behavior to the mechanical and economic necessities of a situation, or who suffer serious harm from such conformity, tend to be weeded out, while those to whom the self-discipline which proves to be mechanically or economically advantageous is easy and harmless, will tend to

survive. In the course of time a race is built up which is able to do things in the right way, to direct its conduct with some regard to the behavior of things; but this race is created and can be created only by the process of selection, trial and error, success and failure, survival and extinction. To say, therefore, that a certain requirement in human conduct produces numerous failures, that many break under the strain, or suffer certain physical, mental, and moral disorders through trying to live up to the requirement, is not enough to condemn it. Does the requirement work well when people do live up to it, and is there a sufficiently large element in the race who can live up to it without harm, to serve as a "saving remnant" and become the progenitors of new generations of superior adaptability? If so, the requirement may well be insisted upon, in spite of the fact that considerable numbers find difficulty in conforming.

True, this is a somewhat hard view of life and conduct; but experience with real things must convince any one that it is hard to do any thing in the right way. Every mechanic knows that it is easier to botch a job than to finish it properly. There is only one right way, or at most very few, of doing anything. There are a thousand wrong ways. This observation applies, without exception, to everything we do; it even applies to living. Not in a purely religious sense, but in the most rigid economic and mechanical sense, "strait is the gate and narrow is the way that leads" to success, or survival, for races, and nations as well as for individuals.

The importance of studying the psychology of behavior with a view to ascertaining how men may be controlled, directed or led to do things in the right way is not to be minimized; but it is of equal importance that we should know the right ways, not simply in the fields of mechanics and technology, but equally in the fields of economics, politics, and even morals. The questions how men actually behave, and why, are important; the questions how *must* they behave, and why, if they are to succeed in this world of struggle, where the forks in the road that lead to survival and extinction always before them, are equally important. If we can

once settle the latter group of questions, we may then turn to the former for the purpose of finding out how our race can be led to do the right things, that is, to do whatever is necessary to its own perpetual success or survival. It seems to the reviewer that Ross has not given the attention to this class of questions which they deserve.

The chief systems of sociology should be classified on the basis of this difference. One group is largely psychological and anthropological, the other is economic and evolutionary. One group aims to describe human nature as it is found, anywhere and everywhere. The other aims, so far as it discusses human nature at all, to describe it as it inevitably tends to become, as it must become under the conditions of the evolutionary processes of selection, and as it has actually tended to become among the more successful races, groups, and classes. One group is primarily concerned with describing and classifying; the other with analyzing and evaluating. Ross's system belongs in the one class, the reviewer's system, if he may presume to mention himself in such connection, belongs in the other; a difference which may account for the criticisms contained in the last few paragraphs.

There are a few other criticisms, mostly of detail, which do not depend upon a difference in sociological system, but rather upon a difference of temperament. Almost every paragraph, as indicated earlier in this review, contains statements that are calculated to provoke discussion and controversy. This feature adds to the value of the book for class room use, but can scarcely be said to add to its value for purely scientific purposes. Some of these statements are so ill-considered as to provoke something more than a questioning attitude and a desire for further light.

A few samples will suffice:

"The World War sprang from a conflict of rival imperialisms. Behind these imperialisms was the greed of certain influential financial or business groups secretly molding the foreign policy of government" (p. 45). This is familiar to those who have listened often to soap box pacifists, but one

does not expect to find it in a book with pretensions to scientific veracity. Again "Less and less is the instinct of workmanship stimulated as the minute subdivision of tasks makes labor a monotonous repetition" (p. 50). The monotonous repetition of this formula is even more depressing than the routine work of the machine tender; besides it does not convince the critical judgment. Few operations are more specialized or monotonous than plowing or knitting; yet Tolstoi has testified to the stimulating effect of the one upon the mind, and the therapeutic effect of the other in case of nervous disorders is well recognized. Anyone who will use his eyes and his mind, and compare a machine tender in a shoe factory with a shoe maker at his bench, is not likely to be deceived as to which is the happier, the freer or the more alert in mind. If it is meant, as is sometimes implied, that an artist is happier in his creative work than the average machine tender is in his monotonous work, the statement may be freely granted; but it does not follow that the average machine tender would be an artist if he were not unfortunately "chained" (to use a common but intentionally misleading word) to his machine, or that he would be happier if he had to make a complete product instead of a minute fraction of it. Moreover, in spite of the fact that laborers have been told repeatedly and vociferously that machine tending stifles their instinct of workmanship and kills all joy in work, they show by their actions that they do not believe a word of it. When the alternative is presented, at the same wages, they will uniformly and without hesitation choose machine tending rather than farm work or even bench work in which they are required to perform a multitude of operations.

"Exclusive capitalist control of industry thwarts the worker's impulse to self-assertion, stirred as it is by the democratic ideas of our time" (p. 50). This seems to imply that "exclusive capitalist control" has been seized by force or authority instead of being won by the process of buying and selling. If some choose to spend their surplus incomes for producer's goods while others spend them for consumer's goods, both are following their impulse to self-assertion, yet the one class will

thereby acquire exclusive control of the capital of the community. Just how it thwarts the desire for self-assertion to allow each class to spend its money as it sees fit, or how anything could possibly be more democratic than this would be difficult to show. If those who chose to spend their money for producer's goods were not allowed to own what they bought, but the ownership were turned over, in part, to those who chose to spend their money for other things, it looks to the reviewer as tho this would be some interference with the "impulse to self-assertion." Even the desire to possess what one has never paid for can scarcely be denatured by suggesting that it is "stirred by the democratic ideas of our time." It is not the instinct to self-assertion so much as the instinct to grab what the other fellow has that is involved. This is not sanctified when done in the holy name of labor any more than when done in the profane name of business, tho there may be more excuse for it in the one case than in the other. It is not stirred by democratic ideas so much as by the sense of unrestrained power which sometimes takes possession of an indignant crowd.

On page 111 Ross points out a very widespread human tendency, which has an important bearing on the case. "The delight of 'taking down' one who is throwing us into the shade is very evident. School boys on the playground 'take it out' of teacher's pet, bespatter the best-dressed child, and pursue the prize pupil chanting some incantation rhyme built about his name. Girls try to take down the girl all the boys are fond of, and the uncouth lads join to humiliate the boy that the girls favor." Why the author is willing to recognize the tendency to "take down" those more successful than ourselves in every game or activity except money getting, or why he should call it the "stirring of democracy" in the latter case and by less euphonious names in all others, is impossible to conjecture. And yet (p. 141) he says "So long as they exhibit the ordinary economic and social virtues, the capable are in no danger from popular envy and cupidity." This is not only inconsistent with his remarks about "taking down" our more successful rivals, but it is contrary to experience except

in a very few of the most enlightened communities of the earth. So far as the world has had experience of proletarian revolutions it has learned that the so-called *intelligenza* fare no better at the hands of a real proletariat than do land-owners and capitalists.

In one of his marginal headings (p. 116) Ross makes the unqualified statement that "no one is really self-centred." The reasons given, however, are merely that no one is absolutely indifferent to the opinions of his fellows. The fact that one cares for their approval certainly indicates a certain, rather intense interest in oneself. If one would rather be well thought of than to have some one else well thought of, that again indicates a certain preference for self as compared with that other person. If one cares more for the good opinions of those nearest him in point of space, kinship, ideals or like-mindedness, than for the good opinions of those less near, that argues also for a certain self-centredness. A being who cared absolutely nothing for the opinions of any other beings would be hard to classify. He could just as well be absolutely without interest in self as be a towering egotist.

Chapter XII, on Exploitation, presents a somewhat gloomy picture. One gets the impression that there is not very much going on in civilized society except exploitation. This results from the author's tendency to call everything exploitation where one class manages to prosper more than another class. Nowhere does he make the important distinction between exploitation based upon the power to inspire fear and that based upon the power to confer benefit. When a group can get what it wants by making others afraid to refuse its demands, whether it prospers thereby or remains poor, there is, qualitatively at least, exploitation. When another group can get what it wants by reason of its power to serve or minister to the needs of others, even tho it prospers thereby, it is doubtful whether the process ought to be called exploitation; yet the unthinking never make any such distinction. Prosperity is sometimes forced upon a man through no fault of his own. The person who is recognized as indispensable can generally get what he desires, whether it be

votes, money or anything else, tho the very people who have benefited through his indispensable service sometimes resent his success, particularly among the backward peoples whose lack of economic virtue has kept them back. The author's indiscriminating discussion of exploitation, and many other parts of the book, show an apparent tendency to cater to those splenetic temperaments who find it easier to believe evil than good of those who achieve any considerable success either in vote getting or money getting.

After asserting (p. 208) regarding sumptuary laws, that they are intended to protect the prestige of the higher social orders, tho often urged on economic grounds, he says:

Monogamic marriage, tolerant enough toward monastic and Shaker celibacy, which put yet greater strain on human nature, suppresses as a dangerous rival every laxer form of sex relation — "free love," the "complex marriage" of the Oneida community, Mormon polygamy, etc. Nor has it acknowledged any right of groups of men and women to order their relations according to their own convictions and judgment.

The statements that monogamic marriage does acknowledge the right of groups of men and women to maintain celibacy, and that it has not acknowledged "any right of groups of men and women to order their relations," etc., are of course, contradictory. But, worse than this is the implication that the strain which an institution, or a standard of conduct puts on human nature is a reason for condemning it, and that relations between men and women might well be left to "their own conviction and judgment." This, however, is consistent with the nervousness of psychological sociologists and economic behaviorists in general lest some law should be passed, practice adopted, or institution established, which should put a strain on human nature. Even more monstrous, however, is the implication that the reason why monogamists disapprove of free love, complex marriage and polygamy is to preserve their own prestige.

"The catering of corporate universities to the prejudices of possible donors would hamper gravely the teaching of the

social sciences were it not that they have to meet the competition of the liberal state universities" (p. 216). It would be interesting to know whether there has been less meddling with academic freedom in state than in endowed universities.

The frequent occurrence of slurs and innuendoes, a few samples of which have been quoted, betraying an animus of the author rather than calmly and dispassionately reasoned conclusions, is the chief weakness of the book. But we must not dwell longer on this weakness lest we be guilty of the vice very prevalent among writers on sociology, including the author before us, of seeing only the evil and the disagreeable in that which they are trying to describe. They resemble certain oriental pessimists, who used to describe man, of whom they had a very poor opinion, by selecting the obscenities of anatomy and dwelling upon them with nauseating particularity. Their statements of detail were true enough, but their pictures of man as a living whole were criminally false. Many of our writers on sociology have formed the habit of selecting certain sore spots on the body politic, and those aspects of normal social life which lend themselves most easily to derogatory description, and of dwelling upon these to the exclusion of everything else.

A possible reason for assuming this attitude is what he calls in his chapter on Opposition (Ch. XIII) the spirit of contradiction. Regarding "born kickers," he says, that they "pose as champions of threatened rights, knightly defenders of the minority, when, in fact, what animates them is the spirit of contradiction." Quoting from Simmel, who detects in himself "a gentle, often scarcely conscious, and even immediately vanishing, impulse to say no to an assertion or appeal," and who "infers that one personality in encountering expressions of the personality of another, cannot assert itself otherwise than by some form of opposition," he concludes that the attitude of hostility is more easily created than that of sympathy and appreciation. It seems, however, that this conclusion is based upon too narrow a field of observation. Some people undoubtedly react in the way described, but it is equally certain that others react in the opposite. Nor is it

very profitable to try to find out how the average man acts. What we need is a reaction curve, showing the distribution of different kinds of reactors to denunciatory and commendatory suggestion. Everyone knows of individuals who are so kindly disposed toward everybody and everything as to assent naturally to everything that is said to them. They react differently from the way in which Simmel finds that he reacts. Between the extremes of counter suggestion and pathological obedience, there are all degrees of good nature and ill nature. If one is in the habit of talking to those at one end of the curve, he will doubtless find it easier to create hostility and resentment than friendship and appreciation. "It is a pity" says Ross (p. 160) "that hostility is a highly suggestible attitude. It seems to be easier for the orator to sway the mob *against* someone than to sway it *for* him. Simmel holds that it is much more difficult to influence the *average man in general* [italics mine] to take an interest in or to feel an inclination of sympathy for a third person previously indifferent than to develop in him mistrust and antipathy."

Mark Antony had to assure the mob that he had not come to praise Caesar before he could even get a hearing, but it was the mob and not the intellectual and moral élite of Rome to whom he was speaking. Anyone with a raucous voice can get an instantaneously favorable hearing from the Sunday afternoon crowds in almost any public place, by merely standing up and denouncing something. At the same time and place it would take a really great orator to create a good opinion regarding the things thus denounced. But it would be hasty to conclude anything about the "average man in general" until we had tried it on other groups of people. Even then we shall probably conclude that we cannot find out much about the "average man in general," but that different groups react differently according to their place in the curve.

These trifling weaknesses should not blind us to the great and conspicuous merits of the book. Among the vast number of statements that are calculated to provoke discussion, some of which are mere slurs and innuendoes, many must be

regarded as genuine flashes of genius. Speaking of the rapid development of human life in cold countries and the slow development of the tropics, Ross remarks: "Had the art of cooling kept pace with the art of heating the story might have been different. Ever since he invented fire and clad himself in skins, man has been in the way of invading the harsher climes; but only our own time has seen the beginning of a technique of cooling which may yet enable him to conquer the tropics instead of succumbing to them" (p. 68).

The materialistic and other special interpretations of history are effectively disposed of as follows:

It is reasonable to suppose that men's attitudes and actions depend most on what most worries them. When they worry chiefly about what the Unseen will do to them, the course of society will be most affected by developments in the field of religion. When they lie awake for fear their property or their lives will be taken, their attitude toward everything will depend on how it is related to the security-furnishing organization, i. e., the State. When their supreme anxiety is where the next meal is coming from, they will be for everything that promises to promote economic success and against everything which appears to hinder it. As soon as one worry is soothed it ceases to shape the course of history and some other supreme worry takes charge.

Whether the book is great enough to dominate the minds of sociological students and determine the character and scope of sociology in the future, remains to be seen. It lacks one quality which such a book ought to possess. It is not convincing. Those who already take Ross's point of view will read it with unmixed delight and complete agreement. Those who take a different point of view will read it with mingled delight and irritation, and with only partial agreement. There is no such logical and consistent line of reasoning supported by ample evidence as should force conviction upon those not already convinced. The book will serve admirably as a thought provoker in the class room; but a great and masterful treatise should do more than this.

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